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Abstract. A framework for consensus modelling is intro-
duced using Kleene’s three valued logic as a means to express
vagueness in agents’ beliefs. Explicitly borderline cases are
inherent to propositions involving vague concepts where sen-
tences of a propositional language may be absolutely true,
absolutely false or borderline. By exploiting these intermedi-
ate truth values, we can allow agents to adopt a more vague
interpretation of underlying concepts in order to weaken their
beliefs and reduce the levels of inconsistency, so as to achieve
consensus. We consider a consensus combination operation
which results in agents adopting the borderline truth value as
a shared viewpoint if they are in direct conflict. Simulation
experiments are presented which show that applying this op-
erator to agents chosen at random (subject to a consistency
threshold) from a population, with initially diverse opinions,
results in convergence to a smaller set of more precise shared
beliefs. Furthermore, if the choice of agents for combination is
dependent on the payoff of their beliefs, this acting as a proxy
for performance or usefulness, then the system converges to
beliefs which, on average, have higher payoff.
Keywords: Agent-Based Modelling · Many-Valued Logics ·
Belief Aggregation · Consensus
1 Introduction
Reaching a consensus by agreeing a shared viewpoint or posi-
tion is a fundamental part of many multi-agent decision mak-
ing and negotiation scenarios. In this paper we argue that
by exploiting vagueness in the form of explicitly borderline
cases we can define an operator for belief combination which
not only allows a population of agents to reach consensus but
also results in them adopting, on average, a more useful set
of beliefs. The basic intuition underlying this operator is that
conflicting agents can agree to allocate borderline truth values
to propositions about which they hold inconsistent beliefs. For
example, two individuals, one of which believes that ‘Cameron
is an effective prime minister’ whilst the other believes that
‘Cameron is ineffective’, may agree, in some circumstances,
to adopt the shared view that ‘Cameron is borderline effec-
tive/ineffective’.
Of course, beliefs about the world do not exist in isolation
but inform and influence our decisions and actions. From this
perspective, some sets of beliefs are more positive or useful
than others, resulting in better long term performance, per-
haps by making the individuals concerned richer, happier or
just better able to survive. More generally, in a multi-agent
context, different beliefs result in different actions, collecting
different payoffs. In this paper we present simulation studies
which show that implementing our proposed operator across
a population of agents, initially holding diverse beliefs, re-
sults in convergence to a smaller subset of more precise shared
opinions. Furthermore, under the assumption that better per-
forming agents, i.e. those with higher payoff, are more likely
to interact to reach consensus, we show that the range of be-
liefs obtained at steady state are on average better, i.e have
higher payoff, than the agents’ initial beliefs. The formalism
adopted here is that of Kleene’s three valued logic and the op-
erator investigated has been proposed for single propositions
in [10] and extended to multi-propositional languages in [6].
An outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 gives a brief
overview of consensus modelling. Section 3 introduces Kleene
logic and the three valued consensus combination operator.
Section 4 describes simulation experiments in which agents
are selected at random to form a consensus provided that they
are sufficiently consistent with one another. In section 5 we
introduce a payoff function for beliefs, so that the payoff of a
particular set of beliefs acts as a proxy for the performance of
an agent holding those beliefs. We then adapt the experiments
described in section 4 so that the probability of an agent being
selected for consensus is proportional to their payoff. Finally,
in section 6 we give some discussions and conclusions.
2 Background and Related Work
A number of models for consensus have been proposed in
the literature which have influenced the development of the
framework described in this paper. [3] introduced a model for
reaching a consensus involving a weighted, global updating of
beliefs, iterating until an agreement is reached. In DeGroot’s
model, agents assign a weight distribution to the population
before forming a new opinion. By applying their assigned
weights to the other agents’ beliefs, an agent can control the
influence that others have on their own beliefs.
As an alternative to DeGroot’s model, the Bounded Con-
fidence (BC) model introduced in [5] provides agents with a
confidence measure. An agent quantifies their level of confi-
dence in their own opinions and are then able to limit their
interactions to those agents who possess similar beliefs if
they are highly confident (small bounds), or extend the range
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of possible interactions if the agents possess low confidence
(large bounds). In this model agents do not a priori assign
weights to the beliefs of others, but instead determine such
weightings based on similarity and on their own confidence
levels. This is similar in essence to the inconsistency threshold
that we introduce in section 3, but applied on an individual
basis.
The Relative Agreement (RA) model [2] then extends the
Bounded Confidence model to allow agents to assign weights
to the beliefs of others by quantifying the extent of the over-
lap of their respective confidence bounds. By having agents
declare a confidence interval for their beliefs, the model then
restricts interactions to those pairs of agents with overlap-
ping intervals. Consequently, agents are only required to as-
sess their own beliefs and are not required to make explicit
judgements about those of other agents. [2] also moved to a
model of pair-wise interactions to better capture social in-
teractions of individuals, the latter being a setting in which
group-wide updates to beliefs are unintuitive in that they do
not reflect typical social behaviour.
A fundamental difference between our approach and the
above models is that we use Kleene’s three valued logic to
represent beliefs in a propositional logic setting, rather than
identify opinions with real values or intervals. [10] have shown
that through use of a three-state model for networked consen-
sus of complete graphs, nodes converge to a consensus much
faster and with greater accuracy when compared to a restric-
tive binary model. In the sequel we extend this approach to a
more general setting involving larger languages and incorpo-
rating a measure of payoff for beliefs.
3 A Three Valued Consensus Model
In this section we introduce Kleene’s three valued logic [4]
as a model of explicitly borderline cases resulting from the
inherent vagueness of propositions. We adopt a propositional
logic setting as follows: Let L be a finite language of propo-
sitional logic with connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬, and propositional
variables P = {p1, . . . , pn}. Also, let SL denote the sentences
of L generated by recursively applying the connectives to the
propositional variables in the usual manner. A Kleene valua-
tion then allocates truth values 0 (false), 1
2
(borderline) and
1 (true) to the sentences of L as follows:
Definition 1. Kleene Valuations
A Kleene valuation v on L is a function v : SL → {0, 1
2
, 1}
such that ∀θ, ϕ ∈ SL the following hold:
• v(¬θ) = 1− v(θ)
• v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
• v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ))
The truth table for Kleene valuations are shown in table 1.
¬ 1 0
1
2
1
2
0 1
∧ 1 1
2
0
1 1 1
2
0
1
2
1
2
1
2
0
0 0 0 0
∨ 1 1
2
0
1 1 1 1
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
0 1 1
2
0
Table 1. Kleene truth tables.
It is sometimes convenient to represent a Kleene valuation
v by its associated orthopair (P,N) [6], where P = {pi ∈ P :
v(pi) = 1} and N = {pi ∈ P : v(pi) = 0}. Notice that P ∩
N = ∅ and that (P ∪N)c corresponds to the set of borderline
propositional variables.
Kleene valuations have been proposed as a suitable formal-
ism in which to capture explicitly borderline cases as resulting
from inherent flexibility in the definition of vague concepts in
natural language [8, 7]. For example, consider the proposition
‘Ethel is short’. For the concept short, we might identify a
lower height threshold h below which any height is classed as
being absolutely short, and similarly there may be an upper
threshold h above which any height is absolutely not short. If
Ethel’s height lay between h and h then this would result in
a borderline truth value for the statement ‘Ethel is short’.
It is important to note that the middle truth value 1
2
is not
intended to represent epistemic uncertainty, but rather explic-
itly borderline cases resulting from the inherent vagueness of
natural language propositions. Hence, if we say that the state-
ment ‘Ethel is short’ is borderline true/false we are not saying
that the truth or falsity of this proposition is unknown. In-
stead we are indicating that Ethel’s height is a borderline case
of the predicate short. In order to emphasise the difference be-
tween the epistemic and the borderline interpretation of three
valued logic it is helpful to think in terms of conditioning. For
instance, if we learn that it is unknown whether or not Ethel
is short, then this provides us with no new information about
her height. In contrast, learning that Ethel is borderline short
does provide us with new information about Ethel’s height,
namely that it lies on the borderline between short and not
short. A more comprehensive discussion of these issues can
be found in [1]. A consequence of using this interpretation of
the middle truth value is that in the current paper we only
model consensus for sets of propositions which admit bor-
derline cases. In other words, our approach can be used for
propositions such as ‘Ethel is short’ but not, for example, for
the proposition ‘Ethel is strictly less that 1.4 metres tall’.
The following three valued consensus operator was de-
scribed in detail in [6]:
Definition 2. Consensus Operator
Let v1 and v2 be Kleene valuations on L with associated
orthopairs (P1, N1) and (P2, N2). Then the consensus v1  v2
is the Kleene valuation with the orthopair
((P1−N2) ∪ (P2−N1), (N1−P2) ∪ (N2−P1))
The corresponding truth table for this operator is shown
in table 2. From this we can see that the operator preserves
the non-borderline truth values 0 or 1 except in the case of
a direct conflict i.e. when one agent has truth value 1 and
the other 0. In this case both agents adopt the middle truth
value 1
2
. Alternatively, from definition 2 we can think of 
as an operator which initially weakens both opinions so as to
remove direct inconsistencies, before then combining them.
 1 1
2
0
1 1 1 1
2
1
2
1 1
2
0
0 1
2
0 0
Table 2. Truth table for the
consensus operator.
I 1 1
2
0
1 0 0 1
1
2
0 0 0
0 1 0 0
Table 3. Inconsistency
truth table.
We now introduce two measures that will be used through-
out the subsequent simulation experiments.
Definition 3. A Measure of Vagueness
Let v be a Kleene valuation on L with orthopair (P,N) and
n propositional variables. Then we measure the vagueness of v
by the proportion of propositional variables which it classifies
as being borderline. That is:
V (v) =
|(P ∪N)c|
n
Definition 4. Inconsistency Measure
Let v1 and v2 be Kleene valuations on L with corresponding
orthopairs (P1, N1) and (P2, N2). Then we define the incon-
sistency measure of v1 and v2 to be the proportion of propo-
sitional variables which are in direct conflict between the two
valuations i.e. v1(pi) 6= 12 , v2(pi) 6= 12 and v1(pi) = 1− v2(pi).
That is:
I(v1, v2) =
|(P1 ∩N2)|+ |(P2 ∩N1)|
n
Table 3 shows the inconsistency truth table of two valua-
tions for a propositional variable, highlighting the cases where
two valuations are inconsistent, and consistent otherwise. We
can see that there is a probability of 2
9
that two valuations
will be inconsistent for each propositional variable in the lan-
guage. In the sequel we will propose a threshold γ ∈ [0, 1] on
inconsistency so that valuations v1 and v2 can be combined
only if I(v1, v2) ≤ γ.
4 Simulation Experiments based on
Random Selection of Agents
We introduce simulation experiments in order to investigate
the convergence properties of the three valued logic operator
when implemented across a multi-agent system. The experi-
mental set up is loosely based on those proposed in [2] and
[9], although our representation of opinions is quite different
with beliefs taking the form of Kleene valuations on L, rather
than vectors of bounded real numbers.
We will consider two distinct initialisations of the beliefs of
a population of agents. The random three valued initialisation
allocates the truth values 0, 1
2
and 1 to each agent and each
propositional variable at random i.e. with probability 1
3
for
each truth value. In contrast, the random Boolean initialisa-
tion only allocates the binary truth values 0 and 1, each with
a probability of 1
2
. This latter initialisation will be required
in section 5 in order to directly compare the proposed three
valued combination operator with a similar two valued op-
erator. In this section we will use the random three valued
initialisation in order to investigate the extent to which the
three valued operator results in convergence to a shared set
of opinions across the population of agents.
We set a fixed maximum number of 50, 000 iterations1. At
each time step a pair of agents are selected at random from
the population. An inconsistency threshold value γ ∈ [0, 1] is
set, so that for any pair of agents with respective valuations v1
and v2, if I(v1, v2) ≤ γ then both agents replace their beliefs
1 In preliminary experiments we found that 50, 000 was an upper
bound on the number of iterations required for the system to
reach steady state across a range of parameter settings.
with the consensus valuation v1  v2, while if I(v1, v2) > γ
then no combination is performed and both agents retain their
original beliefs. For γ = 1 we obtain what is equivalent to the
totally connected graph model described in [10], in which any
pair of agents can combine their beliefs, whilst taking γ = 0
corresponds to the most conservative scenario in which only
absolutely consistent beliefs can be combined. The parameters
for the simulation experiments are then as follows:
• Population size: 100
• Language size i.e |P| = n: 5, 10, 50, 100
• Initial beliefs: Random three valued.
• Inconsistency threshold: γ ∈ [0, 1].
Figures 1 and 2 show the results for the experiments after
50, 000 iterations. In each case the plots show mean values
with error bars representing standard deviation across 100
independent runs of the simulation. Figure 1 shows the aver-
age vagueness determined by taking the mean value of V (v)
(definition 3) across the population. Note that for a random
three valued initialisation of beliefs we expect a mean vague-
ness value of 1
3
at the start of the simulation. As the threshold
γ increases then the average vagueness decreases to zero, so
that for γ ≥ 0.3 we are left with almost entirely crisp (i.e.
Boolean) opinions. In general the more conservative the com-
bination rules (i.e. requiring higher levels of consistency) then
the more it is that vague beliefs are maintained in the popu-
lation. Figure 2 shows the number of distinct valuations (i.e.
different opinions) remaining in the population after 50, 000
iterations. Again this decreases with γ and for γ > 0.4 agents
have on average converged to a single shared belief. This is
consistent with the analytical results presented in [10] for the
single propositional, γ = 1 case.
5 Simulation Experiments Incorporating a
Payoff Model
In this section we extend the simulation framework described
in section 4 to allow for different payoffs for different beliefs.
As outlined in section 1, payoff is introduced as a proxy for
performance, and is motivated by the intuition that different
beliefs result in different actions which then, over time, lead
to different levels of performance. Here we adopt an abstract
simplification of this process in which each Kleene valuation is
allocated a real valued payoff. Then, instead of being selected
at random for combination, an agent is picked from the pop-
ulation according to a probability which is proportionate to
the payoff value of their beliefs. The idea, then, is that agents
with better or more useful opinions will be more successful
and furthermore, it will be these successful agents who will
be most likely to need to reach a consensus between them.
Here the underlying intuition is that, in real systems it is the
most successful agents, with the highest payoff values, who are
most likely to find themselves in conflict with one another, and
who will most benefit from reaching an agreement. We adopt
a simple summative payoff model in which each propositional
variable pi is allocated a value in the range [−1, 1], denoted
f(pi), and the payoff for a valuation with orthopair (P,N) is
then calculated as follows:
f(P,N) =
∑
pi∈P
f(pi)−
∑
pi∈N
f(pi)
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Figure 1. Average vagueness after 50, 000 for varying inconsistency thresholds γ and language sizes.
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Figure 2. Number of distinct valuations after 50, 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ and language sizes.
Another perspective on this type of payoff function is as fol-
lows: For each propositional variable pi, a truth value of 1
results in a payoff f(pi) (which can be either positive or neg-
ative), a truth value of 0 results in the opposite signed payoff
−f(pi), and a borderline truth value 12 results in a neutral
payoff of 0. The payoff value for a Kleene valuation v is then
simply taken to be the sum of the payoffs for each proposi-
tional variable under the truth values allocated by v.
Based on payoff values we define a probability distribution
over the agents in the population according to which the prob-
ability that an agent with beliefs (P,N) is selected for possible
consensus combination is proportional to f(P,N)+n. At each
iteration a pair of agents are selected at random according to
this distribution. For each such pair the inconsistency mea-
sure (definition 4) is evaluated and either both the valuations
are replaced with the consensus valuation, or both are left
unchanged, depending on the threshold γ as in section 4. The
parameters for the simulation experiments are as follows:
• Population size: 100
• Language size: 5
• Initial beliefs: Random Boolean.
• Inconsistency threshold: γ ∈ [0, 1]
binary operator 0 1
0 0 0 : 1
2
, 1 : 1
2
1 0 : 1
2
, 1 : 1
2
1
Table 4. The truth table for the stochastic Boolean consensus
operator
Notice that here we are initialising the beliefs as random
Boolean valuations (see section 4)2. This allows us to make a
direct comparison between the performance of the three val-
ued combination operator and a similar two valued operator.
For the latter we assume that only binary truth values are
available to represent an agent’s beliefs. In this context, in
order for two agents with conflicting truth values for pi (i.e.
one 0 and the other 1) to reach consensus, we propose that
they simply agree to pick one of the truth values at random
e.g. by tossing a fair coin. Table 4 gives the truth table for
the operator in which directly conflicting truth values leads
to a stochastic outcome.
The focus on simulations with 5 propositional variables is
intended to increase the number of opinions relative to the
size of the population, in order to achieve a good distribu-
2 As a result of this Boolean initialisation, a language size of 5 now
produces a total of 25 (32) possible valuations, as opposed to 35
(243) possible valuations.
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Figure 3. Average payoff after 50, 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ, shown as a percentage of the maximal payoff.
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Figure 4. Number of distinct valuations after 50, 000 iterations for varying inconsistency thresholds γ.
tion of valuations. For example, a language size of 5 allows
for 32 possible Boolean valuations. With a population of 100
agents, it is therefore very likely that each opinion will occur
at least once. In comparison, a language size of 10 produces
1, 024 possible Boolean valuations which severely decreases
the probability of an opinion being present in a population of
the same size.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the results for simulation experi-
ments with agent selection based on payoff. The results shown
are mean values with error bars taken over 100 independent
runs of the simulation. Figure 3 shows the average popula-
tion payoff after 50, 000 iterations given as a percentage of the
maximal possible payoff value i.e. the payoff for the valuation
(P,N) where P = {pi : f(pi) > 0} and N = {pi : f(pi) < 0}.
For both the binary and the three valued operators we show
results for simulations in which agents are selected according
to payoff (three-valued, Boolean) and at random as in section
4 (three-valued random, Boolean random). We see that for all
values of γ, the three valued operator with payoff based selec-
tion outperforms all of the other approaches. For the former
we can also see that average payoff increases with γ. In con-
trast, for the other approaches, including the payoff operator
with payoff based selection, the mean of the average popula-
tion payoff remains close to 0 after 50, 000 iterations. Figure
4 shows the mean number of distinct valuations across the
population of agents after 50, 000 iterations. All four versions
of the operators converge on a small set of shared beliefs for
sufficiently large γ. For γ ≥ 0.4 the mean number of distinct
valuations is less than 5 while for γ ≥ 0.8 it is 1. Figure 5
shows a trajectory of how the number of distinct valuations
varies with each iteration when γ = 0.7. We can see that
both the three-valued models converge quickly (in just over
2000) iterations while the Boolean models require consider-
ably longer to converge (over 20, 000 iterations).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the use of Kleene’s three valued
logic as a framework in which to model multi-agent consensus
formation. We have proposed a three valued combination op-
erator, the intuition behind which is that conflicting binary
truth values are replaced with a borderline (middle) truth
value. A number of simulation experiments have been pre-
sented employing this operator. These can be divided into
two main categories. For the first type of experiments, agents
are selected at random from the population and form a con-
sensus valuation providing that the level of inconsistency of
their respective opinions is below a threshold parameter γ.
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Figure 5. Trajectory showing the number of distinct valuations plotted against iterations for γ = 0.7.
Otherwise they do not form a consensus and instead retain
their current opinions. For these experiments we found that
there is convergence to a smaller subset of shared opinions
across the population. For higher γ values there is conver-
gence on average to a single shared opinion and furthermore
this opinion is crisp i.e. it admits no borderlines. For inter-
mediate values of γ the system convergences to a small set of
opinions which to some extent remain vague.
In the second type of experiments a payoff function over
beliefs is introduced, and agents are selected for possible com-
bination with probability proportional to the payoff value of
their current beliefs. Here we compare the three value opera-
tor with a similar stochastic Boolean operator. We find that
the three valued operator with payoff based agent selection
results in convergence to a smaller shared set of beliefs with
significantly higher average payoff than that of the initial pop-
ulation. The Boolean operator does not perform well in this
context and does not result in a significant increase in av-
erage payoff, which instead remains close to 0 after 50, 000
iterations.
The results of the payoff based experiments show how a
three valued model for consensus provides a number of im-
provements over a traditional Boolean model. Firstly, we have
shown that the introduction of Kleene valuations to capture
the inherent vagueness of propositions does not, in the long
run, lead to the mass adoption of borderline truth values as
a result of conflict occurring in the population. Instead, we
have seen how vagueness is reduced at lower γ values, and at
higher γ values the population converges towards completely
crisp opinions on average, admitting no borderline cases. In
addition to this, we can see that the introduction of a payoff
based model drives consensus towards those valuations which
result in higher payoff on average. By selecting pairs of agents
based on their perceived success, we can achieve an increase
to overall payoff in a small number of iterations, compared
to no significant increase in payoff for the Boolean model.
Therefore, we have shown that the three valued approach in-
corporating a payoff model can drive convergence across the
population towards more successful opinions.
We suggest that the experiments presented in this paper
show the potential of using three valued logic in consen-
sus modelling. There is also significant scope to extend the
research presented in several new directions. For example,
the above studies concern consensus defined at the level of
propositional variables. However, in many cases agents will
be most concerned to reach agreement about a relevant set of
compound statements. For example, they may need to reach
agreement about a particular set of conditional statements,
or equivalences. Hence, an important question is that of how
best to extend our proposed consensus model so as to be ap-
plicable to compound logical expressions. Another significant
question concerns uncertainty. Suppose that in addition to
vagueness agents also quantify their uncertainty about be-
liefs. [6] propose an extension of the three valued framework
in which agents’ beliefs are represented by a probability distri-
bution over Kleene valuations. Ongoing research concerns the
design of simulation studies in which to evaluate the conver-
gence and payoff based performance of this extended model.
Finally, it would be interesting to consider extensions to the
operator which allows for consensus between groups rather
than just pairs of agents.
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